‘Sealed in blood’: Where does the China-North Korea alliance stand today?
China and North Korea are celebrating the 65th anniversary of a friendship treaty, but relations between the two countries remain complicated. Chinese leaders often describe
China and North Korea are celebrating the 65th anniversary of a friendship treaty, but relations between the two countries remain complicated. Chinese leaders often describe Beijing’s relationship with North Korea as close “as lips and teeth”, but as warm as bilateral ties appear, this is a relationship underscored above all by strategic necessity. On July 11, 1961, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Beijing. Sixty-five years later, the treaty remains in force, containing a mutual defence clause committing either side to assist the other if one comes under armed attack. It is China’s only formal military alliance, underlining the treaty’s importance, but much has changed since it was signed. A sign of the continued importance of this treaty came this week, with a three-day visit by North Korea Premier Pak Thae Song to Beijing to celebrate the friendship treaty. But during the past 65 years, China has transformed itself from an impoverished revolutionary state into the world’s second-largest economy, while North Korea remains isolated and heavily sanctioned. Yet their alliance has survived the Cold War, China’s economic opening to the world, the collapse of the Soviet Union and decades of tension over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme. Why has it lasted through these? Neither side can afford to let it fail. China wants stability The China-North Korea relationship was forged during the Korean War, when United States-led forces advanced towards China’s border in 1950, and Beijing sent hundreds of thousands of troops into North Korea.
China called them “volunteers”, but they fought under Chinese command and suffered enormous casualties. That shared history remains central to the official narrative and Chinese and North Korean leaders frequently describe the friendship as one “sealed in blood”. Their ideological values broadly align. Both are socialist one-party states deeply suspicious of Western power, and both oppose the presence of American troops on the Korean Peninsula. Both accuse Washington of using alliances, sanctions and military pressure to contain countries that refuse to accept its authority. But shared ideology only goes so far, with China embracing foreign investment, private enterprise and global trade. Beijing increasingly portrays itself as a reliable international partner and leader of the Global South, while North Korea has largely shut itself off from the world. Beijing prizes predictability whereas Pyongyang often uses instability to gain attention, leverage or concessions. China’s priority is not necessarily a stronger North Korea but a stable one. Beijing does not want the North Korean government to collapse, which could potentially send massive numbers of refugees across their 1,400km (870-mile) border and raise the possibility of a unified Korean Peninsula aligned with Washington. North Korea therefore serves as a strategic buffer between China and the US presence in the region. Beijing also doesn’t want war, as this would disrupt trade in the region and potentially create a nuclear crisis on China’s doorstep. This explains China’s sometimes contradictory position – in the past it has supported United Nations sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, while opposing measures it believes could destabilise the government.
