The supertanker tycoon making millions on Hormuz shuttle runs
Just a few weeks into the war, one of the Persian Gulf’s top oil producers quietly began sneaking its crude out of the Strait of
Just a few weeks into the war, one of the Persian Gulf’s top oil producers quietly began sneaking its crude out of the Strait of Hormuz. Before long, the covert project became so successful that the United Arab Emirates was already approaching its pre-war rate of flows through the waterway by the time the US and Iran signed their interim peace deal. The UAE’s aggressive push to get barrels safely out of the strait relied on tactics normally associated with sanctioned countries like Iran, Russia and Venezuela: the ships traveled “dark” without their transponders (and often under the cover of literal darkness) before offloading their cargo into other tankers waiting outside the waterway, and then returning back to collect more. Crucially though, officials in Abu Dhabi needed enough ships to make the risky transit — not just once, but over and over. And for that they turned for help to Ga-Hyun Chung. The intensely private Korean shipping tycoon rocked the tanker industry early this year as his Sinokor Group embarked on an unprecedented buying spree. Bloomberg reported in March that he stood to be one of big winners from the turmoil in the oil trade from the Iran war, as rates for tankers surged. Now, Sinokor has emerged as a major owner of supertankers moving crude out of the Persian Gulf. The company started leasing ships to Abu Dhabi Oil Co. for its “shuttle runs” from at least mid-April. By June, almost half of Emirati crude shipments were sailing on vessels controlled by Sinokor, according to ship tracking data collected by analytics firm Vortexa. This story is based on vessel tracking data compiled by Bloomberg, figures from Vortexa and Kpler, another leading analytics firm, and conversations with more than a dozen shipbrokers, traders and other industry insiders. The scale of Sinokor’s role in leasing ships for “dark” transits has not previously been reported. Sinokor didn’t respond to requests for comment. Adnoc L&S, which is Adnoc’s shipping and logistics arm, said it doesn’t comment on matters related to the position, movements, or routing of its vessels, but noted that it has “an extensive fleet including owned and chartered vessels.” While Adnoc also relied on tankers it owned directly, as well as from other owners, the deals with Sinokor were key to helping the UAE ramp up exports through Hormuz far faster than its Gulf neighbors. The shipments meant Adnoc was able to take greater advantage of surging oil prices earlier in the war, and helped alleviate the impact of the broader closure of the strait on global supplies. The company has continued to ramp up shipments, with tankers traveling more openly through the strait with transponders on since the interim peace agreement. But the deals have also created a huge profit opportunity for Sinokor, Chung and his new co-owner, Italian container giant MSC Group. Oil tanker markets are having one of the most lucrative years ever, and shipbrokers suggest that the premium for sailing into the Gulf during the war could have yielded three to four times the prewar rate. The terms of the deals haven’t been disclosed, but the brokers estimated just three tankers doing shuttle runs since mid-April could have earned Sinokor somewhere around $60 million to $120 million.
The BriefWire