Evolution under fire: Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ in a post-war era
Has Iran’s regional deterrence been permanently degraded, or is its proxy network mutating into a resilient force? The memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the
Has Iran’s regional deterrence been permanently degraded, or is its proxy network mutating into a resilient force? The memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the United States and Iran has halted more than three months of direct warfare. The agreement, which includes lifting a US naval blockade and establishing a $300bn reconstruction fund for Iran, has fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape. According to a research paper by the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (AJCS), the MOU represents a strategic setback for Washington’s initial war aims, effectively abandoning the goal of regime change. The framework also signals a potential end to Israeli ambitions of uncontested regional hegemony, with the US implicitly recognising Iran as a legitimate regional power. However, this prolonged conflict has imposed a severe stress test on Iran’s “axis of resistance” – the regional network of pro-Iranian allied forces, including the Lebanese group Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, and armed groups in Iraq. s the dust settles, Al Jazeera spoke to experts on Iran in an attempt to unpack the tactical losses, strategic adaptations, and future capabilities of Tehran’s proxy network to answer a critical question: Has Iran’s regional deterrence been permanently degraded, or is the axis mutating into a more decentralised, resilient force? Tactical losses and homeland deterrence For decades, Iran relied on its regional allies as part of its “forward defence” doctrine designed to keep conflicts away from its borders. But interestingly, during the US-Israeli war – with Iran’s own territory, military infrastructure, and national security at stake – Tehran chose to largely rely on its own missiles, drones, and control over the Strait of Hormuz, rather than unleash the full force of its allies. In fact, several of the members of the “axis of resistance”, notably the Houthis, acted cautiously when they could have opened up new fronts in the conflict. That restraint is central to the debate over the axis’s future. Has Iran’s regional deterrence been permanently degraded, or is it evolving into a looser, more decentralised network that is harder to destroy?
Nader Hashemi, a professor of Middle East politics at Georgetown University, argues that the war has revealed a weakening of Iran’s regional doctrine. “Right now, the Axis is at [the] weakest that it has ever been since its formation,” Hashemi stated. He noted that during the conflict, Iran’s own national security took precedence over Hezbollah, concluding that the overarching forward defence strategy was “significantly weakened”. Proponents of that argument can point to the limited impact of the attacks conducted by Hezbollah and pro-Iran groups in Iraq, compared with Iran’s own arsenal of weapons. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that the doctrine has failed, said Negar Mortazavi, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy. Instead, Mortazavi believes that the doctrine has undergone a necessary strategic adaptation. “It exposed its limits but also accelerated a shift toward homeland-based deterrence,” Mortazavi explained. While regional partners remained crucial for opening new fronts and creating strategic depth, she noted that Iran’s long-range missiles, inexpensive drones, and leverage over the Strait of Hormuz became the new centrepieces of its defence strategy. That refocuses Iran’s deterrence. Previously, the forward defence doctrine meant that the threat that fronts could be ignited in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere kept Iran’s foes wary. But Israel’s willingness to unleash war on several fronts, highlighting the relative weakness of those forces and its own willingness to absorb the cost of those conflicts, weakened Iran’s deterrence. By showing that it also can absorb attacks and retaliate directly, in a more powerful way than its allied forces can, Iran has reestablished deterrence, in a different form. For Ahmed al-Komi, a Palestinian journalist and researcher based in Tehran, that is not evidence of failure. He highlighted that the performance of the Axis, particularly Hezbollah’s ability to withstand massive blows, surprised many. “It was the right decision [by Iran] at the beginning to stick with the allies,” al-Komi argued, noting that Tehran continues to view this network as an indispensable front line against US presence and Israeli operations.
