How does Trump’s MOU with Iran compare with Obama’s nuclear pact?
Trump promised a better deal than the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran, but this understanding appears to concede more to Iran in several ways
Trump promised a better deal than the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran, but this understanding appears to concede more to Iran in several ways. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) for ending the US-Iran war has been electronically signed near the French capital, Paris, after weeks of US President Donald Trump’s repeated claims that an agreement was close. The 14-point framework signed on Wednesday sees Iran commit to refrain from procuring or developing nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief, a $300bn reconstruction plan and the restarting of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. In comments made on the sidelines of the G7 meeting in France on Wednesday, Trump hailed the deal with Iran as being better than the deal brokered by former US President Barack Obama in 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Trump withdrew from during his first term in 2018. However, analysts warn it is too soon to determine whether the MOU, which triggers a 60-day negotiation period, will result in a comprehensive deal significantly different from the 18-page Obama-era document, which took several years to negotiate and included the input of nuclear experts. Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, associate fellow at Chatham House, in the UK, told Al Jazeera it would not be “fair” to compare the two at this stage, as the MOU focuses on extending the ceasefire rather than tackling Iran’s nuclear programme in detail. Shahram Akbarzadeh, director of the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia, said the MOU “does not address any issue of substance.” “It simply leaves all questions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and enrichment to be negotiated between the United States and Iran,” he said. Here’s how the little we do know about the agreement compares to the provisions of the JCPOA. Curbing Iran’s nuclear and weapons programmes The agreement pushes discussions about Iran’s nuclear programme into the 60-day negotiation period, but states that Tehran “shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons”. Both sides also commit to “resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon”. The JCPOA included the same commitment not to develop nuclear weapons from Iran. It did allow Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent for 15 years – enough for developing a nuclear power programme, but well below the 90 percent needed to produce nuclear weapons. The memorandum does not mention whether Iran will be allowed to enrich uranium at all or for how long.
Up until Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, independent inspectors confirmed that Iran had stuck to the specified limits. Akbarzadeh pointed out that the Iranian pledge not to develop nuclear weapons included in the MOU is “not a new point, or a new commitment”. “Iran has consistently reiterated that it does not pursue the atomic bomb,” the analyst said. Additionally, while the JCPOA was an international agreement including China, Russia, the UK and Germany “with detailed measures to limit uranium enrichment and an intrusive monitoring regime to ensure Iranian compliance”, the memorandum is a shaky bilateral agreement between parties who have little trust in each other, Akbarzadeh said. While the JCPOA had very specific terms for sanctions in the event of non-compliance, no such details are in the memorandum. The JCPOA did not place limits on Iran’s conventional military, including its supply of ballistic missiles – something that the US had demanded before the start of the war, but which is similarly not addressed by the MOU. Frederic Schneider, non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, also noted that, in itself, Iran’s commitment to refrain from developing nuclear weapons was no significant gain for the US. “A Trump deal achieving this would be merely preserving the status quo,” Schneider told Al Jazeera, adding that intelligence agencies, including the CIA, had already concluded before the US-Iran 12-day war in June 2025 that Tehran was not actively developing nuclear weapons. “It is doubtful that any Trump deal will achieve any improvements on the JCPOA on that matter,” he concluded. Sanctions relief and investment The memorandum states that the US commits “to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran” and to develop with regional partners “a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development” of the country. While the JCPOA made gradual sanctions relief conditional on Iran’s compliance with curbs on its nuclear programme, the wording of this memorandum states that the waiver will take effect on “an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal”. Ali Alavi, lecturer in Middle Eastern and Iranian studies at SOAS University of London, in the UK, said the removal of sanctions is a priority for Tehran, made more urgent by the extensive economic damage inflicted by weeks of war. While the JCPOA did not include funding for economic development, which was never on the table during previous negotiations, the $300bn investment fund pledged for reconstruction in Iran through regional partners is a massive payday which could lift Tehran out of its isolation.
