America’s Iran playbook: after coercion, a return to diplomacy

Published 18 June 2026 · us

In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the country out of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), labeling former President Barack Obama’s landmark nuclear

In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the country out of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), labeling former President Barack Obama’s landmark nuclear deal as one of the worst agreements made in the history of international negotiations. Eight years later, following military threats, crippling economic sanctions, and renewed hostilities in West Asia, the United States is back exploring talks with Iran. It may come off as a paradox. How could the President, who recently abandoned the deal by former President Obama, even consider making negotiations of his own? That is because there has been a recurring trend in America’s foreign policy throughout the last couple of decades. Despite any difference in ideologies, political affiliations or strategies, every U.S. administration comes to the realisation that Iran cannot be bullied with airstrikes, sanctions or diplomatic isolation. Starting from George W. Bush to Mr. Obama, and then from Mr. Trump to Joe Biden and Mr. Trump yet again, the administration in Washington has experimented with various approaches to coercion. However, the final outcome seems to be rather predictable: diplomacy. What is noteworthy is that this trend is more indicative of structural realities of power in the contemporary international system rather than of Iran alone. ‘Axis of evil’ In 2002, when former President George W. Bush designated Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil”, many believed that Iran would be the next target of America’s military intervention following Afghanistan and Iraq. This, however, did not occur, and there were straightforward explanations for this. In contrast to Iraq, Iran is not a small Arab nation with weak forces. It is an example of a civilisation-state with a dense population, a huge area that stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, and a strategically positioned nation connecting West Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. Most importantly, Iran lies across the Strait of Hormuz, which is one of the most important oil chokepoints in the world, with a significant share of internationally shipped barrels of oil passing through it. Like we witnessed in the recent conflict in West Asia, any large scale conflict involving Iran will have instant repercussions for the international oil market.

The American policy makers were well aware of this truth. In spite of being at the pinnacle of their military superiority, the cost of occupying or invading Iran was considered prohibitive. Their experience in Iraq made this realisation stronger. If the stabilisation of Iraq itself was not an easy task, handling a crisis in Iran would have been an even bigger challenge. This was the point where the choice was made and the first lesson was learned: Iran was too important to be neglected, but too expensive to be conquered. Under Obama’s aegis When Mr. Obama became the President, he inherited the Iran dilemma, a problem that previous administrations had failed to solve despite years of trying. By the late 2000s, Iran continued to develop its nuclear programme at a steady pace. Sanctions had harmed the country’s economy significantly, yet they had not stopped Iran from enriching uranium. The belief that sanctions would automatically make Iran change its stance proved incorrect. On the contrary, the Obama administration saw sanctions as tools that could be used to get Iran to negotiate. This insight is what eventually shaped the JCPOA. It aimed neither to change Iran’s regime nor settle all the issues between the two countries. Instead, the agreement was intended to put verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear programme, increase the period necessary to build a nuclear weapon and create a completely new inspection regime. Advocates viewed the agreement as an achievement while critics argued that it settled too few things, especially with regards to Iran’s missile programme and actions in the region. However, both supporters and opponents recognised that sanctions alone were unable to stop Iran’s nuclear development. The agreement was not a perfect solution, but a recognition of the failure of coercion in achieving what was intended. Trump’s stance Trump entered office intending to prove that Mr. Obama had conceded too much, and eventually withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. His central argument for leaving the deal was quite simple. The deal involved temporary limitations, sanction relief and ignored the rest of Iran’s behavior. Mr. Trump believed that he could achieve a better deal through maximum economic pressure.