The long-term implications of the U.S.-Iran deal
The world is holding its breath with respect to the June 14 adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Iran and the United States
The world is holding its breath with respect to the June 14 adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Iran and the United States for a cessation of hostilities and a 60-day period of negotiation to iron out their thorny differences. The scepticism stems from at least two scores of premature claims by U.S. President Donald Trump. Moreover, this is only the beginning of a meandering journey pebbled with numerous obstacles. Vicious bloodletting in two wars during the past year has exacerbated instinctual mutual distrust. Hence, even this vaguely worded framework is no mean feat. Can the world now hope for a durable resolution to this multifaceted crisis, or does the MoU merely kick the can down the road? Some contextual developments create a space for cautious optimism. The respective announcements by both Tehran and Washington are factual and measured, eschewing trenchant triumphalism and demonisation. They have emphasised the complexity of negotiations; both realise that their asymmetric wars were militarily unwinnable, and a sustainable solution would require political negotiations with the recalcitrant enemy. The twin Hormuz blockades morphed into economic attrition, and Iran’s threat of expanding the next war beyond the region, with the Houthis choking the Bab el-Mandeb strait again, was foreboding. Both sides were also facing growing domestic discontent, with their respective erratic conduct alienating supporters and neighbours. In front of the international community, both nations have lost their moral high ground, each appearing as irresponsible and vindictive. A long road The scope and complexity of the current issues are daunting. These include the question of U.S. sanctions, a release of over $100 billion of frozen Iranian assets, regional issues such as the crisis in Lebanon and the problem of U.S. military bases, and the demand for reparations. However, Iran’s nuclear enrichment and its assertion of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz are deal breakers. Since President Trump tore down the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, he now insists on a “better” deal, requiring Iran to export enriched uranium.
However, Iranian hardliners are steadfastly opposed to this diktat. Moreover, Iran’s closure of the Hormuz chokepoint has caused the “biggest energy disruption in human history”, creating havoc for the global economy. A resolution of these two contentious issues would require protracted negotiations and creativity, allowing both sides to claim victories. A $300 billion fund to reconstruct Iran with U.S. companies, a typically bizarre Trumpian transactional diplomacy, is also reportedly on the table. Here, one must also mention the various other influences in the negotiation chamber — Israel and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) significantly influence the thinking at the White House, while China and Russia each have an inside track in Tehran. Pakistan, the official mediator, also has its own multiple axes to grind. Discernible undercurrents Irrespective of largely unaltered borders and an endgame that has barely commenced, the past three years of hostilities have triggered seismic geopolitical changes in West Asia and beyond, irretrievably unhinging its longstanding strategic paradigms. While the situation is still evolving, some basic medium-to-long-term undercurrents are discernible. First, the two Iran wars have dramatically overturned numerous basic global assumptions. It has shown the limits of American hyperpower with its penchant for military solutions, high-tech battlefield dominance, air superiority doctrine, social media-provoked mass uprising etc. Iran was able to counter this with incipient strategies; careful planning for asymmetric warfare; smart and cost-effective tactics; a resilient and coherent command structure; leveraging of geostrategic assets; resolute supply chains and defence production among others. American MAGA (Make America Great Again) hotheads and Chinese wolf-warriors may need to pull in their claws, hopefully, making the world a safer place. Moreover, the failure of ad-hoc coercive diplomacy may bring back multilateralism. Nations are now going to fret more about choke points, preventive diplomacy, robust supply lines, and adequate strategic reserves for essential inputs. Physical security and the succession of command of the political leadership would be prioritised and ruggedised. Second, the hobbled return to regional peace may be catastrophic for global hydrocarbon supplies as depleting strategic reserves compete with demand destruction.
