Trump and Iran find a fragile peace as nuclear questions still loom
The Donald Trump administration and Iranian negotiators finalised a preliminary Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 14 to end active hostilities and establish a 60-day
The Donald Trump administration and Iranian negotiators finalised a preliminary Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 14 to end active hostilities and establish a 60-day window in which to conclude formal negotiations, according to Pakistan, which mediated the negotiations. It is to be signed on June 19 in Switzerland, after which the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened and the U.S. naval blockade will be lifted. The MoU has not yet been published in full. Jeffrey Lewis, Distinguished Scholar of Global Security at Middlebury College, wrote on X that he was “pretty sure both the Iranians and the Trump administration will lie egregiously about the contents of the MoU” and that it would be prudent to “wait for the text”. In the interim, however, important questions linger about Iran’s nuclear programme — the excuse the Trump administration used to escalate a war and which many believe he was ultimately desperate to exit, not least because of the effects of his policy on international oil prices. The details currently available about the MoU come mainly from unnamed Iranian officials speaking to news agencies, including Reuters. The following analysis therefore distinguishes between the specific language Reuters has reported is included in the draft MoU about the nuclear programme and Iran’s longstanding public positions on them. (“MoU” is used to mean what Reuters has reported.) Item no. 1 “Tehran agrees it will neither produce nor acquire nuclear weapons” Long-term position: Iran has consistently maintained that it does not seek nuclear weapons, citing both strategic calculations and a religious decree issued by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declaring such weapons forbidden under Islam. Tehran has also repeatedly argued that, as a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it has a right to peaceful nuclear technology while rejecting accusations that it seeks a bomb. Successive Iranian governments have accepted similar language, including in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (a.k.a. the Iran deal), which explicitly tried to ensure Iran’s programme remained peaceful. Position immediately before and during the war: Iran continued to deny any intention to build nuclear weapons even as it accumulated large quantities of uranium enriched to 60%.
Subsequently it also curtailed access to inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian officials also argued that external pressure and military attacks will force Tehran to reconsider its nuclear doctrine, but they also stopped short of announcing any decision to weaponise. Has the MoU changed Iran’s position? Not really. Iran has publicly maintained that it neither possesses nor seeks nuclear weapons. Future possibilities: The key is verification. If in the final agreement — due to be hammered out in the next 60 days — Iran agrees to robust IAEA monitoring, the credibility of its longstanding claims in the international community may improve. If not, scepticism will linger. Item no. 2 “Pending a final agreement, Iran would maintain the current status of its nuclear programme, refraining from further uranium enrichment and expansion of nuclear facilities” Long-term position: Iran’s position since the early 2000s has been that enriching uranium on Iranian soil is the nation’s sovereign right. So even when Tehran has accepted temporary restrictions and caps on enrichment levels, it has rejected demands for no enrichment at all. The Iran deal also acknowledged this position and allowed limited enrichment under specific constraints. Position immediately before and during the war: Before the war, Iran had moved substantially beyond the deal’s limits. According to the IAEA, it had accumulated hundreds of kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% and an unspecified but large amount of uranium enriched to lower levels. Uranium purified to 60% can be easily made weapons-grade. According to Iran, these measures were responses to the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Iran deal and the reimposition of sanctions, and that they could be reversed if necessary. Has the MoU changed Iran’s position? Tactically, perhaps. Iran appears to have accepted a temporary freeze on further expansion rather than dismantlement. The language reported by Reuters explicitly refers to maintaining the “current status” rather than reducing enrichment capacity, which aligns closely with Iran’s longstanding position that its existing capabilities are legitimate and irreversible. Future possibilities: The main unresolved issue is whether Iran will accept limits on enrichment levels and the number and setup of its centrifuges (devices that enrich uranium).
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