The Mecca pact is not just another regional alliance
It could set the stage for a profound transformation of regional security in the Gulf. The joint defence agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and
It could set the stage for a profound transformation of regional security in the Gulf. The joint defence agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan in Mecca on Friday is not another entry in a region already crowded with alliances and communiques. Its significance lies less in its provisions than in what it signals: a shift in how the Gulf states conceive of their own security. Riyadh and its neighbours appear increasingly unwilling to tie strategic security to a single guarantor. The alternative is a wider network of partnerships that diversifies options, capabilities, and room for manoeuvre. Read this way, the pact does not mark the end of the United States-led order. It marks the start of preparation for a more pluralistic one — a system in which regional powers produce security rather than import it. It is, in effect, an insurance policy against a world where the US is less present and less predictable. The pact has all the potential to jump-start a major transformation of regional security. Moving beyond dependence on US power Events of the past decade have changed the calculus in the Gulf. The question is no longer the magnitude of American power, but the predictability of its use. A state can buy tens of billions worth of US weapons, host bases and troops, and cultivate deep ties with Washington — then discover in a crisis that the decision to act is determined by American domestic politics and geopolitical calculations largely unrelated to allied security.
Gulf capitals have now concluded that partnership, however deep, is not an automatic guarantee of protection. The resulting strategy is straightforward: keep the alliance with Washington, but build options beyond it. This is not a defection from the American camp to the Chinese, Russian, or Turkish one. It is an attempt to move past the logic of camps altogether. It is also a reflection of a region preparing itself for a likely US withdrawal in the future. The most sensitive dimension of regional security in this scenario concerns the balance of power. If the American role recedes, the danger lies in who may fill the vacuum it leaves behind. Iran has spent decades building regional influence beyond its borders and continues to direct missiles and drones at Gulf and Arab capitals. Israel has demonstrated military and intelligence superiority that has enabled force projection across the region. At the same time, it continues to pursue occupation and settlement policies and military action against Arab states. Diminished American weight could leave the region inside an order whose rules are set by two actors alone: Israel and Iran. The Mecca pact is best understood as an early attempt to build a third pole — a bloc that does not need to fight either power, but one that has enough weight to deny either a monopoly over the region. The objective is not victory. It is the prevention of hegemony. Iran cannot be written out of the Gulf equation.
