Why Mali’s northern conflict has entered a dangerous new phase
A separatist–al-Qaeda alliance has shifted the balance of power in northern Mali and complicated efforts to end the war. Bamako, Mali – An unprecedented battlefield
A separatist–al-Qaeda alliance has shifted the balance of power in northern Mali and complicated efforts to end the war. Bamako, Mali – An unprecedented battlefield partnership between a separatist movement and an al-Qaeda affiliate has transformed the conflict in northern Mali, shifting the military balance and deepening divisions over how, if at all, the war can end. When the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) launched a joint offensive on April 25, 2026, the conflict entered a phase unlike any before. A war that had long pitted the Malian state against multiple armed groups gave way to a coordinated campaign stretching from Kidal and Anefis to Tilemsi, Gao and Sevare, posing the most serious challenge to the Malian army in years and to Russia’s Africa Corps, the Kremlin-backed force that replaced the Wagner Group in Mali. Since then, the fighting has been marked by simultaneous assaults, ambushes, drone strikes and attacks on military convoys, with all sides claiming significant battlefield gains. Bamako says it is working to restore state authority and dismantle what it calls a “terrorist alliance” between the FLA and JNIM. The FLA says it remains committed to independence for Azawad, the name separatists use for northern Mali, while JNIM portrays the war as part of a campaign to “liberate” Mali and overthrow the government, which it accuses of relying on Russian forces. More significant than the offensive itself, however, is the unprecedented military cooperation between a nationalist separatist movement and an al-Qaeda affiliate. Their political ambitions remain fundamentally different, yet their cooperation has already reshaped the conflict and could have far-reaching implications for security across the Sahel. The partnership emerged after the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, which sought to end years of fighting between Bamako and northern armed groups through greater decentralisation and political representation, but whose implementation repeatedly faltered. Successive military coups after 2020 reshaped Mali’s political leadership and security strategy. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali and imposed sanctions, while Russia deepened its military role by deploying the Wagner Group in late 2021.
After Russia folded the Wagner Group’s operations into the state-controlled Africa Corps, renewed fighting left neither the government nor northern armed groups able to impose a lasting settlement. How the alliance took shape On paper, cooperation between the FLA and JNIM appears unlikely. The FLA traces its roots to northern separatist movements that declared the independence of Azawad during the 2012 rebellion, a claim never recognised by the Malian state or the international community. It presents itself as a secular nationalist movement seeking independence for Azawad, while JNIM seeks to overthrow governments it considers illegitimate and establish governance based on its interpretation of Islamic law. Yet senior officials from both groups told Al Jazeera those ideological differences have been set aside to confront a common enemy. Colonel Mohamed Issa, a senior FLA officer, said the movement remained committed to an independent Azawad, arguing that previous peace agreements repeatedly collapsed because successive governments in Bamako failed to honour them. Negotiations, he said, would only be acceptable if they recognised Azawad’s right to separate. Issa rejected suggestions of an ideological alliance, describing the relationship as a battlefield arrangement against a common enemy. He said the JNIM-affiliated fighters operating alongside the FLA were exclusively Azawadis rather than members of the group’s wider regional network, arguing they were motivated primarily by defending their communities against the Malian army and what he described as Russian “mercenaries”. Suleiman, a senior JNIM field commander who requested that only his first name be used for security reasons, described the relationship in broader terms. He said the group approved operational coordination with the FLA after internal consultations because fighters on both sides largely came from “one people” caught up in the same conflict and because their liberation goals had become “relatively unified”. He also claimed the FLA had accepted Islamic legal arbitration by local religious scholars, one of JNIM’s core objectives, a point the FLA itself did not raise. Bamako, meanwhile, has described the relationship as a “JNIM/FLA terrorist alliance” that threatens Mali’s sovereignty.
The BriefWire