Revocation of bail warranted only if continuing liberty is ‘so egregious’ that it undermines justice: Supreme Court

Published 22 July 2026 · india

The Supreme Court on Wednesday (July 22, 2026) said interference with bail orders is warranted only where the continuation of liberty is “so egregious that

The Supreme Court on Wednesday (July 22, 2026) said interference with bail orders is warranted only where the continuation of liberty is “so egregious that it undermines the administration of justice”. Deprecating the routine practice of challenging bail orders before it under Article 136 of the Constitution, the court said its extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction ought to be invoked only in exceptional cases. The oral observations were made by a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi Mohan while hearing petitions filed by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and the Chhattisgarh government challenging the bail granted by the Chhattisgarh High Court in January to Chaitanya Baghel, son of former Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Bhupesh Baghel, in cases arising out of an alleged liquor scam. Addressing senior advocate Mahesh Jethmalani, appearing for the State government, Justice Bagchi questioned whether the apex court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136, should examine every alleged legal infirmity in a bail order and curtail an individual’s liberty on that basis alone. “When the court interferes under Article 136, it does so on the anvil of whether the continuance of liberty is so egregious that it affects the administration of justice. Is it the correct approach, particularly for a court of last resort, to treat the legal artistry of a bail order as the sole and only test for depriving a person of liberty?” Justice Bagchi said. Expressing concern over the apex court’s burgeoning docket of petitions challenging bail orders, the judge underlined that Article 136 jurisdiction was never intended to function as an ordinary power of judicial review but as a “repository of justice” for interpreting the Constitution. “We should dig deeper. Notwithstanding any illegality in a bail order, the question is whether the scales of justice warrant depriving a person of liberty on that basis alone...

High Courts should ordinarily be the final arbiters of bail appeals,” he added. Remarks expunged Acknowledging the Bench’s concerns, Mr. Jethmalani nevertheless contended that the High Court’s order was “perverse” and that Mr. Baghel had been granted bail on “flimsy grounds”. He also objected to the adverse remarks made by the High Court against the State’s Economic Offences Wing, which is investigating the alleged liquor scam. “He is influential, he is the son of a former Chief Minister... Your Lordships should at least expunge those remarks; otherwise, there will be great injustice to the investigating agency,” he submitted. Agreeing that the remarks against the investigating agency were “uncalled for”, the Bench ordered them to be expunged from the High Court’s order but declined to interfere with the grant of bail to Mr. Baghel. The Bench, however, clarified that all questions of law would remain open to be agitated before the concerned trial court at the appropriate stage. Najeeb precedent During the hearing on Wednesday, Justice Bagchi also praised the precedent laid down in Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, authored by Surya Kant in 2021, while heading a three-judge Bench as a Supreme Court judge at the time. Justice Bagchi remarked that the ruling had come as a relief for courts trying to reconcile the stringent statutory restrictions on bail under anti-terror laws with the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21. The apex court had held that prolonged incarceration and undue delay in trial could “melt down” the statutory restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967, which bars the grant of bail where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations are prima facie true. Senior advocate Mukul Rohatgi, appearing for Mr. Baghel, however, was quick to point out that despite the “pathbreaking” ruling having authoritatively settled the law, courts had continued to distinguish it instead of faithfully applying its mandate.